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THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
CHARLEs E. CARPENTER*THE law relating to res ipsa loquitur is replete with conflict, confu-
sion and doubt. There is division of opinion as to the circum-
stances required for its application and still greater disagreement
as to the effect to be given it. Does it merely lay the basis for a permissible
inference of negligence by the jury or does it raise a presumption of negli-
gence, and if and where it raises a presumption, what weight is to be given
to it? It is not clear that where it is treated as a presumption, the court
will direct a verdict for the plaintiff in the absence of rebuttal evidence by
the defendant, nor is it at all clear what quantity of evidence will be re-
quired to prevent a directed verdict or how far the presumption survives
the refusal to direct a verdict for the plaintiff, that is, what effect the jury
shall give it. Then, too, there is much confusion with respect to the effect
of pleading special acts of negligence.
It is the belief of the writer that it is wholly useless and mischievous to
have a distinct doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which has the effect merely of
laying the foundation for a permissible inference of negligence, and that it
best serves its excuse for being if it is treated as a presumption which shifts
the burden of proof to the defendant.
A brief statement of the law relating to res ipsa loquitur as found in the
decisions will lay the foundation for our argument.
CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR THE APPLICATION OF
R.ES IPSA LOQUITUR
It is clear that the plaintiff has not produced evidence enough to make
out a res ipsa loquitur case where he merely shows that he has sustained an
injury. In Benedick v. Potts,' at the trial the following facts were shown
by the plaintiff: that the defendant operated a railway in a pleasure re-
sort. Cars were hoisted up an incline to the highest point of the railway
and allowed to run down by gravity upon a circular track. At one place
the track passed through a tunnel about one hundred and fifty feet long.
Cars and occupants while passing through this tunnel were hidden from
outside observation. The cars were provided with handles to grasp during
the rapid descent. The plaintiff occupied alone the rear seat of one of these
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California.
'Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 40 AtI. io67 (1898).
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cars during its descent. He was in the car when it entered the tunnel but
not when the car emerged. He was later found inside the tunnel in an un-
conscious condition with a wound upon his head. The trial court upon
this evidence instructed the jury that there was no legal evidence of neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant and a verdict and judgment were
entered for the defendant. On appeal the supreme court sustained the
trial court in this ruling, saying:
In no instance can the bare fact that an injury has happened of itself and divorced
from all surrounding circumstances justify the inference that the injury was caused by
negligence.
2
It is a perfectly well settled principle that to entitle the plaintiff to recover in an
action of this kind he must not only show that he has sustained an injury but that the
defendant has been guilty of some negligence which produced the particular injury.
The negligence alleged and the injury sued for must be in the relation of cause and
effect. The concurrence of both and the nexus between them must exist to constitute
a cause of action.3
The orthodox statement of res ipsa loquitur makes three requirements
for its application. First, there must be an injury caused by the operation
of an appliance or instrumentality in the exclusive possession and control
of the defendant. Second, the appliance must have been such as ordinarily
would not produce injury unless carelessly constructed, inspected or used.
Third, the injury must have occurred without voluntary action on the part
of the plaintiff.4 The basis of the presumption and that which justifies the
casting of the burden of proceeding with the production of evidence on the
defendant is said to be the fact that the evidence of the cause of the injury,
whether culpable or innocent, is ordinarily more accessible to the defen-
dant than it is to the plaintiff.s
The first requirement, namely, that the injury for which the plaintiff
seeks recovery must have arisen from an instrumentality in the exclusive
possession and control of the defendant is uniformly made.6 A res ipsa
loquitur case is frequently found where objects fall from places in posses-
sion of the defendant and strike and injure the plaintiff.7 It finds frequent
2bid., 
.55
3 Ibid., 54.
4Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) § 2509. s Ibid.
6 Scellars v. Universal Service, 68 Cal. App. 252, 228 Pac. 879 (r924); Sullivan v. Minneapo-
lis St. Ry. Co., i6i Minn. 45, 2oo N.W. 922 (1924); Sylvia v. Newport Gas Light Co., 45 R.I.
515, 124 Atl. 289 (1924); Sund v. Wilmington, & P., Traction Co., i W.W. Harr. (Del.) 328,
114 At. 281 (920). See note in 53 A.L.R. 1495.
7 It has been applied where the plaintiff passed under the defendant's shop window and
was struck by a barrelwhich fellfrom the shop window. Byrnev. Boadle, 2 H. &C. 722 (1863).
Where the plaintiff passing along the highway under defendant's bridge was struck by a brick
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application in the cases of injuries to passengers resulting from collision
between cars belonging to the same company.8 It has been applied in
more doubtful cases of collision between the car of defendant in which the
plaintiff was a passenger and a car not under the control and management
of the defendant. 9 It has been applied where a surgeon knocks out a tooth
in removing tonsils' ° or where he left a needle" or a bandage- ' in the pa-
tient's body. The doctrine is not invoked where there is divided responsi-
bility or where the accident is due in part to the acts of a third party over
whom the defendant had no control,13 or where the injuring agency is
under the control and management of the plaintiff.' 4 The mere fact that a
third person, an intermeddler in no way connected with the defendant,
tampered with the thing or made it defective or dangerous does not defeat
the application of the rule.' 5
The second requirement universally made is that the apparatus or ap-
pliance must have been such that in its ordinary operation no injury was
to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspection or user.,6 It
which fell from a pier of the bridge. Kearney v. London Ry., L. R. 5 Q.B. 411 (1870). See also
Soriero v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 86 N.J.L. 642, 92 Ati. 6o4 (1914). It was applied where a
shade around an electric light in a chandelier in defendant's music hall fell on the plaintiff.
Goldstein v. Levy, 74 Misc. 463,132 N.Y.S. 373 (191x). Where a radiator in the wall of a lobby
of defendant's theater fell and injured the plaintiff. Carlson v. Swenson, 197 Ill. App. 4
(iif6). Where an electric light fan fell upon and injured a patron in defendant's theater. Haun
v. Tally, 40 Cal. App. 585, 18i Pac. 81 (igg). Where the roof of defendant's theater collapsed
and fell on the plaintiff and others. Lyman v. Knickerbocker Theater, 5 F. (2d) 538 (C.A.,
D. of C. 1925). Where electric wires fell in an alleyway. Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Co,
145 Mo. 5o2, 46 S.W. 968, 47 S.W. 907 (1898). Where the bucket of a concrete mixer dropped,
Meyer v. Tobin, 82 Cal. Dec. 565, 4 P. (2d) 542 (193 X). Where the walls of a building collapsed,
Fox v. Bronx Amusement Co., 9 Ohio App. 426 (1918). Where a window pane fell, Sinkovitz v.
Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788, 64 S.E. 93 (igog); a window screen. Southwestern T. & T.
Co. v. Sheppard, 189 S.W. 799 (Tex. 1916) a corner of a building fell. DeMun Estate Corp. v.
Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., i96 Mo. App. 1, 187 S.W. 1'24 (1916).
8 Sand Springs Park v. Schrader, 82 Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983 (1921); Loudoun v. Eighth
Avenue Railway Co., 162 N.Y. 38o, 56 N.E. 988 (0goo).
9 Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. Co., 233 N.Y. 285, 135 N.E. 504 (1922). See also note in
13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 6o9, 61o.
lo Brown v. Shortlidge, 98 Cal. App. 352, 277 Pac. 134 (1929). See note to Bollenbach v.
Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, '73 N.E. 670 (1930), in 26 Ill. L. Rev. 350 (193i).
- Sellers v. Noah, 2o9 Ala. zo3, 95 So. 167 (1923).
12 Palmer v. Humiston, 87 Ohio St. 4oi, io1 N.E. 283 (1913).
13 Loehner v. North Chicago St. fly. Co., 116 Ill. App. 365 (i9o4).
14 White v. Spreckels, io Cal. App. 287, io Pac. 920 (1909).
IS Van Horn v. Pacific Refining Co., 27 Cal. App. 1O5, 148 Pac. 951 (1915).
16 \Vigmore, supra note 2, § 25c9; see cases collected in article on Negligence, 45 C.J. 1212,
§ 780, footnote 2.
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is not sufficient to show that the injury occurred and that it occurred
through an instrumentality which was exclusively within the control and
management of the defendant. The instrumentality and its operation
must have been such as ordinarily would not have produced injury in the
absence of negligence. It is sufficient, however, that the circumstances
surrounding the accident render it more probable that the injury was due
to the negligence of the defendant than otherwise.'Y An injury received
from the operation of an instrumentality in the exclusive control of the
defendant will not always give rise to an inference of negligence and if it
does not the res ipsa loquitur doctrine cannot be applied. Thus, in Piehl v.
Albany Ry. Co.,," where a flywheel was disrupted and a portion of it cast
across the street into a saloon, killing the plaintiff's intestate, it was held
that a mere bursting of the flywheel was not sufficient to warrant an infer-
ence of negligence because the disruption of flywheels does frequently pro-
ceed from causes which science is unable to discover and guard against and
therefore negligence is not to be inferred from such occurrence alone. The
case indicates the unqualified necessity of the requirement of a set-up of
facts which will warrant reasonably an inference of negligence. The exclu-
sive control and possession of the defendant of the instrumentality of the
injury is incidental to that end, and also to indicate that such exclusive
control and possession on the part of the defendant makes knowledge of
the facts surrounding the cause of the injury presumably more accessible
to the defendant than to the plaintiff.' 9
A third requirement in the orthodox statement is that the injury must
have occurred without voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff
°
.2
While it is not uncommonly emphasized that the special reason or ex-
cuse for the existence of res ipsa loquitur is that since injury occurred under
circumstances concerning which the defendant is in a superior position to
have knowledge it is therefore fair that he should be required to produce
the evidence in explanation, it is only occasionally in the cases that it is
held that the doctrine cannot be invoked if the circumstances do not sug-
gest or indicate this superior accessibility to the evidence on the part of
the defendant, or, where it appears that the plaintiff has equal or superior
means of information.2T
17 Howser v. Cumberland Ry., 8o Md. 146, 30 Ati. 9o6 (1894); Mathews v. Chicago Ry.
Co., 162 Minn. 313, 2o2 N.W. 896 (1925).
x8 Piehl v. Albany Ry. Co., 30 App. Div. x66, affd. in 162 N.Y. 617, 57 N.E. 1122 (1goo).
x" For a similar case see Hughes v. Atlantic City & Shore Ry. Co., 85 NJ.L. 212, 89 Atl. 769
(1914)-
2O Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2509.
2z See cases collected in article on Negligence, 45 C.J. 1205, § 773, footnote 46.
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Another requirement occasionally made is that direct evidence must
have been unavailable to the plaintiff in order to invoke res ipsa loquitur.
Some cases have held that the rule is one of necessity, providing a substi-
tute for direct proof of negligence only where such direct proof is unavail-
able, and that it can only be invoked where direct evidence is unavailable,
and that unless the plaintiff presents all the testimony reasonably within
his power he can derive no benefit from the doctrine.22
EFFECT OF TEE APPLICATION OF R-ES IPSA LOQUITUR
(a) Establishes the Basis for a Permissive Inference of Negligence by the
Jury. Where the plaintiff presents a res ipsa loquitur case, what effect is
to be given it? The view which seems to prevail in the greater number of
jurisdictions is that a res ipsa case merely lays the foundation for a per-
missible inference by the jury of negligence on the part of the defendant./3
The proof of the accident and the injury, with attending circumstances
though there is no direct evidence of the defendant's negligence or causal
relation to the injury, entitles the plaintiff to go to the jury. A motion for
a non-suit of the plaintiff or a directed verdict for the defendant will be
denied. If the defendant does not introduce any evidence to overcome the
case made for the plaintiff, the plaintiff will be entitled to have the jury
consider under proper instructions whether or not the facts shown war-
rant them in making the inference that the defendant was guilty of the
negligence which caused the injury. If the jury finds for the plaintiff that
the defendant was guilty of such negligence, the verdict of the jury cannot
be disturbed. Under this view the plaintiff will not be entitled to a direct-
ed verdict on the failure of the defendant to introduce evidence. This
view seems to obtain in Connecticut*24 Colorado'5 Iowa,26 Michigan'7
-Bahrv.Lombard, 53 NJ.L. 233,21 AtI. 190 , 23 At. 167 (I89O); Cass v. Sanger, 77 N.J.L.
412, 71 Ati. 1126 (igog); Levendusky v. Empire Rubber Mfg. Co., 84 N.J.L. 698, 87 At. 338
(x913).
23 See cases collected in note, 53 A.L.R. 1494, 1511.
24 Stebel v. Connecticut Co., go Conn. 24, 96 At. 171 (igi5); Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn.
333, i55 At. 219 (193).
25 Colorado Springs Ry. Co., v. Reese, 69 Colo. x, i69 Pac. 572 (1917); but compare Velotta
v. Yampa Valley Coal Co., 63 Colo. 489, 167 Pac. 971 (1917) in which apparently a presump-
tion is raised.
-6 Duncan v. Ft. Dodge Gas & Elect. Co., 193 Iowa 1127, i88 N.W. 865 (X922).
27 Barnowski v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523, 5o N.W. 989, (i8gi); Burghardt v. Detroit United
Ry. Co., 2o6 Mich. 545, 173 N.,. 360 (igig); Fuller v. Magatti, 231 Mich. 213, 203 N.W.
868 (1925); Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 209 N.W. 835 (1926); Kerr v. City of Detroit,
255 Mich. 446, 238 N.W. 190 (I93x).
Compare statement in 45 C.J. 1194: "In Michigan the presumption of negligence arising
under the rule of res ipsa loquitur has not been recognized as such in the cases; on the con-
trary it is frequently stated in express terms that the rule has not been adopted in this state.
(Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 209 N.W. 835; Fuller v. Magatti, 231 Mich. 213, 203 N.W.
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Minnesota,2s New Jersey 2 9 North Carolina,30 Ohio, 3' and Okla-
homa.32
(b) Establishes a Presumption of Negligence. In several states, a res ipsa
loquitur case is given the effect of raising a presumption. This means that
the res ipsa case lays the foundation not merely for the jury's possible in-
ference of negligence on the part of the defendant, but the jury will be re-
quired by the court to make such inference. If the plaintiff makes out a
res ipsa loquitur case and the defendant does not assume his burden of go-
ing forward with evidence, the court, if it is satisfied that the plaintiff's
evidence so clearly establishes a res ipsa loquitur case that a jury could not
reasonably find otherwise, will direct a verdict for the plaintiff.33 If the
court is not so certain that a res ipsa case has been made out, it will leave
it to the jury to find if such a case exists and if such is found, a verdict will
be directed for the plaintiff. Frequently the language of a court points
toward a presumption, but the effect in fact given to the res ipsa loquitur
case is merely to permit an inference of negligence.34 In the following
868; Burghardt v. Detroit United R. Co., 206 Mich. 545, 173 N.W. 36o, 5 A.L.R. 1333. But
see Waidleich v. Andros, 182 Mich. 374, 148 N.W. 824 (where the term "res ipsa loquitur" is
used in the opinion).) This statement, however, in conformity with the rule as generally ap-
plied, is apparently, and in effect, but a repudiation of the doctrine as construed to raise a
presumption of negligence from the mere occurrence of the injury, rather than an actual repu-
diation of the principles upon which the doctrine is based. For, notwithstanding the denial of
the doctrine, those principles which in other jurisdictions are embraced within, and designated
as, the rule of res ipsa loquitur, are recognized and applied by the courts of this state, although
only as rules of circumstantial evidence, (Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 209 N.W. 835;
Fuller v. Magatti, 231 Mich. 213, 2o3 N.W. 868; Burghardt v. Detroit United Ry. Co., 206
Mich. 545, 173 N.W. 360, 5 A.L.R. 1333.) so as to raise a presumption or permit an inference
of negligence in cases where the circumstances involved are such as would otherwise be within
the application of the ruile."
25 Keithley v. Hettinger, 133 Minn. 36, 157 N.W. 897 (ig6); Kleinman v. Banner Laundry
Co., 15o Minn. 525, r86 N.W. 123 (1921); Ryan v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 168 Minn. 287,
21o N.W. 32 (1926); Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N.W. 310 (193i);
Vergeldt v. Hartzell, i F. (2d) 633 (1924).
29 Dennery v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 82 N.J.L. 517, 8i Atl. 861 (ig ii); Hughes v.
Atlantic City, 85 N.J.L. 212, 89 Atl. 769 (igi4); Sheridan v. Arrow Sanitary Laundry Co.,
146 Ati. 292 (N.J. 1929); Sheridan v. Foley, 58 N.J.L. 230, 33 Ati. 484 (1895).
30 Womble v. Merchants' Grocery Co., 135 N.C. 474, 47 S.E. 493 (x9o4); Lyles v. Brannon
Carbonating Co., 14o N.C. 25, 52 S.E. 233 (i9o5); Modlin v. Simmons, 183 N.C. 63, 12O S.E.
661 (1922); Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 111 S.E. 177 (1922).
31 Glowacki v. Northwestern Ohio Ry. & Power Co., 116 Ohio St. 451, 157 N.E. 21 (2927).
32 Sand Springs Park v. Schrader, 82 Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983 (1922). See 12 Cal. L. Rev.
140 (2924).
33 Something more is required by some courts for a directed verdict. See Giles v. Giles, 204
Mass. 383 (igi o ) 90 N.E. 595; Sunderland, Directing a Verdict, ii Mich. L. Rev. 198 (1913).
34 How much evidence the defendant must introduce in order to overcome the presumption
is a matter which will be discussed later.
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states the res ipsa case has sometimes been treated as establishing a
presumption: California, 35 Kentucky,36 Illinois, 37 Iowa,38 Louisiana,39
Missouri,4° New York,4' Pennsylvania,42 and South Carolina.43
What is the quantum of evidence required of defendant to overcome
the presumption when such is raised by a res ipsa loquitur case? It should
be borne in mind that in such a case the probative effect or logical cogency
of the plaintiff's case before the defendant introduces any evidence is one
which would warrant the jury finding for the plaintiff, though it might, of
course, find for the defendant. The cases are uniform in requiring for the
application of the res ipsa loquitur case a setup from which it is reasonably
inferable that the injury would not have happened without negligence on
the part of the defendant. It seems clear that the defendant ought not to
escape a directed verdict against him by merely introducing some evi-
dence. It should at least be credible and have some probative force. As to
how much, there is little or no indication in the cases. 44
(c) Shifts Burden of Introducing Evidence or Burden of Proof. While
there are many unguarded statements to the effect that the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant,
some of these expressions are made without observing the distinction be-
tween the shifting of the burden of going forward with evidence and the
shifting o the burden of proof or persuasion proper. In several cases
where the distinction is observed, the courts have held that while the bur-
3s Bush v. Barnett, 96 Cal. 202,31 Pac. 2 (I892); Green v. Pacific Lumber Co., 13o Cal. 435,
62 Pac. 747 (19oo); Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1895); Lejeune v.
General Petroleum Corp., 128 Cal. App. 404, 13 P. (2d) 1057 (1932).
36 Quillen v. Skaggs, 233 Ky. 171, 25 S.W. (2d) 33 (1930).
37 Everett v. Foley, 132 IUI. App. 438 (1907).
38 Fitch v. Mason City Traction Co., 124 Iowa 665, ioo N.W. 618 (i9o4); Weber v. Chicago
R.I. & P.R. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 1SI N.W. 852 (i915); Arnett v. Ill. Central Ry., i88 Iowa 54o,
176 N.W. 322 (1920).
39 Motor Sales & Service v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (1930).
40 Brown v. Consolidated Light, Power & Ice Co., 137 Mo. App. 718, 1o9 S.W. 1032 (X908);
Myers v. City of Independence, I89 S.W. 8x6 (Mo. i916). But see Brown-Scott v. Davis,
216 Mo. App. 530, 270 S.W. 433 (1925), approving Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 33 Sup.
Ct. 416, 57 L.Ed. 8i 5 (913).
4, Barkeley Scow Corporation v. G. V. Petrie & Son, 37 F. (2d) 58 (1930); Goldstein v.
Levy, 74 Misc. 463, I32 N.Y.S. 373 (I9Ir); Storms v. Lane, 223 App. Div. 79, 227 N.Y.S. 482
(1928); Loudoun v. Eighth Avenue Ry. Co., 162 N.Y. 380, 58 N.E. 988 (i9oo); Plumb v. Rich-
mond Light & Ry. Co., 233 N.Y. 285, 135 N.E. 504 (1922).
4' Folk v. Schaeffer, 186 Pa. 253, 4o Atl. 401 (I898); Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133
Atl. 568 (1926).
43 Sullivan v. Charleston & W.C.Ry. Co., 85 S.C. 532, 67 S.E. )c5 (igio). Shelton v. S. P.
Co., 86 S.C. 98, 67 S.E. 899 (igio).
'4 The amount that should be required is discussed infra, 531-535.
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den of going forward shifted to defendant, the burden of proof did not.4s
However, there are a respectable number of courts which have held that
the burden of proof proper shifted. 46
EFFECT OF PLEADING SPECIFIC ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE UPON TIE
USE OF RES IPSA LOQUIT-R
Under a general allegation of negligence the plaintiff may prove negli-
gence by introducing enough evidence to make out a res ipsa loquitur case,
the plaintiff not being in possession of direct evidence of negligence, is per-
mitted to rely upon the res ipsa loquitur rule, and make out a case from
which negligence may be inferred. If the plaintiff instead of a general alle-
gation of negligence in his complaint sets out specific negligent acts or
omissions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.47 Thus in a case
where the defendant carelessly and negligently parked his automobile so
that it rolled down a grade and struck the plaintiff who was engaged in
working on the street, and the complaint alleged that at the time the de-
fendant parked said automobile he so carelessly and negligently applied
the brakes of the said automobile as to permit said automobile to roll
down said slope and strike the plaintiff and there was no pleading of gen-
eral negligence, it was held improper to instruct the jury with respect to
the res ipsa loquitur rule.48 What is the effect of alleging specific acts of
negligence after sufficient general allegations have been set out to permit
proof of a res lpsa loquitur case? Must the plaintiff now rely wholly upon
establishing the specific acts of negligence alleged or may he rely on his
res ipsa loquitur case to establish the allegations of general negligence?
45 See notes 53 A.L.R. 1494, 59 A.L.R. 486, i6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 527, A.L.R. i9i6A, 930; Va-
lente v. Sierra Railway Co., 151 Cal. 534,91 Pac. 481 (1907); Lejeune v. Gen. Petroleum Corp.,
128 Cal. App. 404, x3 P. (2d) 1057 (1932); Crooks v. White, 107 Cal. App. 304, 290 Pac. 497
(i93o); Diller v. Northern Cal. Power Co., 162 Cal. 531, x23 Pac. 359 (1912); Phillipsen v.
Hunt, 129 Ore. 242, 276 Pac. 255 (1929); Eaker v. International Shoe Co., 199 N.C. 379, 154
S.E. 667 (X930).
46 Montgomery & Eufaula Ry. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 209, 9 So. 363 (i89i); jacks v. Reeves,
78 Ark. 426, 95 S.W. 781 (i9o6); Bush v. Barnett, 96 Cal. 202, 31 Pac. 2 (1892); Green v. Pac.
Lumber Co., 130 Cal. 435, 66 Pac. 747 (I900). [But see Valente v. Sierra Railway Co., 15i
Cal. 534, 91 Pac. 481 (1907) and Lejeune v. General Petroleum Corp., 128 Cal. App. 404, 13 P.
(2d) 1057 (I932)]; Weber v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 1i N.W. 852 (i916);
Jones v. Pelley, 128 S.W. 305 (Ky. igio); Pindell v. Rubenstein, 139 Md. 567, II5 At]. 859
(1921); Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 315 Mo. 987, X002-4, 288 S.W. 777 (1926);
Johns v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 226 Pa. 319, 75 Atl. 408 (ig9o); Sullivan v. Charleston & W.C.
Ry. Co., 85 S.C. 532, 67 S.E. 905 (igo); Shelton v. Southern Ry. Co., 86 S.C. 98, 67 S.E. 899
(19xo); Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696, 75 S.E. 1032 (1912); Johnson
v. Grays Harbor R. & Light Co., 142 Wash. 520, 253 Pac. 8i9 (1927).
47 Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal. App. 61o, 300 Pac. 487 (193i).
48 Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal. App. Dec. 405, 15 P. (2d) 888 (1932).
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Apparently three answers have been given to this question in the cases.
In some jurisdictions allegations of specific acts of negligence preclude the
plaintiff's making use of the doctrine.49
Other jurisdictions take the view that the additional allegations of spe-
cific acts of negligence in no way affect the plaintiff's right to rely upon his
res ipsa loquitur case.5'
A third view is that of a compromise between these two extremes by
which the plaintiff will not be deprived entirely of his use of the res ipsa
loquitur case by alleging specific acts of negligence. He may use the res
ipsa loquitur case to establish the existence of the acts of negligence, al-
leged specifically. Thus, in Atkinson v. United Railroads of San Franciscos'
in an action for the death of a passenger, the street car in which he was
riding struck a truck. In addition to general allegations of negligence, the
complaint charged specific acts of negligence against the street car com-
pany in that its car was being carelessly operated at an excessive rate of
speed in violation of the municipal ordinance and without any notice or
warning of its approach. The court held that this did not deprive the
plaintiff of the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since all the evidence
shown and which established the res ipsa loquitur case only went to prove
the allegations of specific acts of negligences2
The argument generally advanced in favor of not permitting the plain-
tiff to make use of his res ipsa loquitur case where he alleges specific acts of
negligence is that since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests upon the fact
that presumptively the facts are not accessible to the plaintiff but are
accessible to the defendant, the law should relieve the plaintiff from, and
shift over to the defendant, this burden of producing the evidence. When
the plaintiff goes forward and alleges specific acts of negligence on the part of
the defendant, this demonstrates that the facts are accessible to the plain-
tiff and the basis for invoking the res ipsa loquitur doctrine no longer exists.
49 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Leonard, 126 11l. App. 189 (r9o6); Byland v. E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours, 93 Kan. 288, 144 Pac. 25, (1914); Cooper v. Century Realty Co., 224 Mo.
709, 123 S.W. 848 (i909); Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 443, 99 S.W. lo62 (1907);
Ft. Worth Railway Co. v. Neal, 14o S.W. 398 (Tex. 19ii).
so Firszt v. Capitol Park Co., 98 Conn. 627, 12o At. 300, 29 A.L.R. 17 (1923); Cassady v.
Old Colony Railway Co., 184 Mass. i56, 68 N.E. 10 (1903); Washington-Virginia Railway Co.
v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696, 75 S.E. 1032 (1912); Walters v. Seattle Ry. Co., 48 Wash. 233, 93
Pac. 419 (1908).
s Atkinson v. United Railroads of San Francisco 71 Cal. App. 82, 234 Pac. 863 (1925).
s2 For other cases adopting this compromise rule, see Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, i19 Ga.
837,47 S.E. 329 (i9o4); Terre Haute & I. RR. Co. v. Sheeks, i55 Ind. 74,56 N.E. 434 (i9oo);
Sutton v. So. Ry. Co., 82 S.C. 345, 64 S.E. 401 (29o9); see also, note in 13 Cal. L. Rev. 424
(1925), on the Effect of Alleging Specific Acts of Negligence on the Use of the Res Ipsa Loqui-
tur Case.
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If the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is treated as having the effect merely of
laying the basis for a permissible inference by the jury of negligence on the
part of the defendant, it would certainly seem unfair to the plaintiff if he
has facts which establish a case having the probative value warranting an
inference of negligence, that he should be deprived of it if he goes a little
further and makes allegations of specific acts of negligence and attempts
to rest his case on such ground as well as upon general allegations, that is,
upon the res ipsa loquitur case. It seems a strange doctrine which would
deprive the plaintiff of the use of evidence of sufficient probative value to
establish his case, merely because he exhibits the hope that he may be able
to rest his case also on other evidence. It seems, too, that we should not
have a system of justice which takes away from the courts this evidence
so essential in determining justice between the parties. It would therefore
seem that in a jurisdiction which treats the res ipsa loquitur case as merely
raising a permissible infereice of negligence it is sound to allow the plain-
tiff, to allege both general and specific acts of negligence, and to rely upon
both or either as the case develops. The compromise view set out in the
Atkinson case seems as unwarranted as the view which denies all use of the
res ipsa loquitur case where the complaint contains allegations of specific
acts of negligence, and besides, it has the grave defect of adding the diffi-
culty of determining when the evidence establishing the res ipsa case does
not go beyond showing the existence of the specific acts of negligence al-
leged which would forfeit its use.
In this connection, a general principle of pleading that specifications of
negligence set out in a complaint control all general allegations and limit
the proof at the trial to the acts specified, must be recognized as a sound
rule of law, at least in so far as such principle of pleading rests upon the
doctrine that the plaintiff must not take the defendant by surprise. But
where the surprise element is avoided by setting out the specifications of
negligence, not as explanations of a general allegation, but as further
specified acts of which the more general allegation is only the first, 3 or
where the general allegations of negligence are set out in one count and the
specific allegations are set out in another, so that there is no possibility of
the defendant fairly complaining of surprise, there seems to be no basis
whatever for depriving the plaintiff of his right to rely upon the res ipsa
loquitur case to establish negligence, merely because he has set out in his
complaint specific acts of negligence.
Where the rule of res ipsa loquitur is treated not merely as laying the
basis for a permissible inference but as having something more than its
53 Clark, Code Pleading (1928), 208.
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probative value, by reason of the fact that the evidence concerning the
injury is presumably accessible to the defendant and not to the plaintiff,
and for that reason the burden is passed over to the defendant and the
plaintiff relieved of it, there may be more basis for the view which deprives
the plaintiff of his use of the res ipsa loquitur case when he has alleged spe-
cific acts of negligence. For, by alleging the specific acts of negligence, he
has shown that these facts which were presumably accessible only to the
defendant are also accessible to him, and in so far as the doctrine has arti-
ficial force, that is, that it requires an assumption of facts beyond that re-
quired by logical inference, it would not be unfair to deprive the plaintiff
of that advantage.
However, in any case, a plaintiff should never be deprived, in the ab-
sence of surprise upon the defendant or for some other valid reason, of the
probative force of any case he may be able to establish, merely by reason
of the fact that he has pleaded specific acts of negligence. This rule that
an allegation of specific acts of negligence deprives the plaintiff of his res
ipsa loquitur case, as has been ably pointed out, is valuable to a defendant,
not because it protects him from surprise, but because it gives him an op-
portunity to catch an unwary opponent'in a damaging error.5 4
CRITICISM OF .ES IPSA LOQUITUR
(a) Where it is given the effect of a permissible inference. The res ipsa lo-
quitur case has no excuse for existence if it is to be treated as having the
effect merely of laying the basis for a permissible inference of negligence.
One set of circumstances universally required in a res ipsa loquitur case is
that the facts warrant a reasonable inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant. But if the circumstances shown are sufficient to warrant an
inference of negligence, why require the further showing of an instrumen-
tality in the exclusive control and possession of the defendant, and that
there was no voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff? Should evi-
dence which reasonably warrants an inference of negligence be excluded
because further facts cannot be shown? Is the res ipsa loquitur case another
situation to which the best evidence rule extends, nay, where we go fur-
ther and deny the use of competent and adequate circumstantial evidence,
even when direct evidence is not available, because certain other circum-
stantial evidence is not shown? No such distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence is made elsewhere in the law. It seems highly
technical and unjust to refuse the plaintiff the use of evidence which might
in some cases, clearly, and in others, in all probability, establish his case. It
seems clear that the court should have this material to aid it in ascertaining
s4 Niles, Pleading Res Ipsa Loquitur, 7 N.Y. Univ. L. Quar. 415 (1929).
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the truth. Nevertheless, the evidence is not available to the plaintiff if a
single one of the technical requirements laid down by the rule is not present.
Another effect of the rule is to divert the mind of the court and counsel
from the truly material issues in the case in order to discover whether the
technical requirements exist. For instance, the inquiry may turn on
whether the defendant has or has not exclusive possession of the instru-
mentality causing the injury, and that in a case, too, where it seems proper
to hold the defendant to liability without showing he had control or pos-
session of the instrumentality which caused the injury.55 Has a railway
company sufficiently exclusive possession of its tracks and switches to sat-
isfy this requirement? Any test to determine that fact other than whether
under the facts of the particular case the inference may reasonably be
made that the injury arose from the negligence of defendant's servants,
seems futile.
Further, as has been pointed out,56 there is frequently great difficulty in
determining whether the evidence shows specific acts of negligence or
merely evidence to establish a res ipsa loquitur case. For example, where a
dentist's drill slipped from the plaintiff's tooth and lacerated his mouth.5 7
Is that a specific act of negligence or a case for the application of res ipsa
loquitur? Such inquiry ought to be useless. It should be enough if from
the facts it is reasonably inferable that the injury resulted from defend-
ant's negligent act or omission.
(b) Where it is given the effect of a presumption. If, on the other hand,
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine involves something more than a permissive
inference to be made from the evidence introduced, that is, if it may have
some artificial weight, if the law requires the assumption of negligence on
the part of the defendant on the production of evidence making out a res
ipsa loquitur case in the absence of any evidence in opposition by the de-
fendant, there seems to be more justification for a rule of res ipsa loquitur
with its technical requirements. Presumption is here used to mean a rule
of law relating to proof that requires the assumption that a fact exists on
the proof of another fact or group of facts. The existence of such fact may
not always be logically inferable from such fact or group of facts. The fact
or facts proved may be given a purely logical effect or both a logical and
artificial effect, or a purely artificial effect in assuming the existence of the
other fact. The artificial effect given the evidence in the res ipsa case rests
ss See note, 4 So. CaLL. Rev. 4o0 (x931), on Motor Sales & Service, Inc., v. Grasselli Chem-
ical Co. 15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (1930).
s6 Supra, 526.
57 Vergeldt v. Hartzell (C.C.A. 8th 1924), I F. (2d) 633; Vale v. Noe, 172 Wis. 421, 179
N.W. 572 (1920).
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upon the defendant's greater accessibility to certain facts and justifies the
shifting of the burden at least with respect to producing the evidence as to
these facts upon the defendant. Too, there is a basis for the position that
the plaiitiff's pleading special acts of negligence should deprive him of the
use of the res ipsa loquitur case, for by so pleading he has shown that the
evidence is probably not inaccessible to him. However, in such case, the
plaintiff should not be robbed of any more than the artificial weight which
the law gives to the res ipsa loquitur case, and he, therefore, should not be
deprived of his opportunity to rely upon the case for the purpose of going
to the jury, but only be denied the effect of the presumption.
As to the quantum of evidence required of the defendant to rebut the
presumption of negligence raised by establishing a res ipsa loquitur case,
the decisions shed little light. Of course the effectiveness of a presumption
may vary with respect to the degree of proof required of the plaintiff to
establish his case in the absence of a presumption, that is, whether the
plaintiff is required to establish the facts at issue beyond a reasonable
doubt, as is required of the state in criminal cases, or whether he has done
enough to persuade the jury that it is more likely than not that the facts
upon which his case rests exist, or whether he must go further and estab-
lish the facts of his case by clear and convincing evidence although it falls
short of establishing conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. In most juris-
dictions, only the intermediate degree of proof, namely, that it is more
likely than not that the fact exists, is required of the plaintiff in negligence
cases. We confine our discussion to cases requiring that intermediate de-
gree of proof.
A variety of effects have been given to presumptions.58 In considering
S8 Professor Edmund M. Morgan, in a very thorough discussion of Burden of Proof, in 47
Harv. L. Rev. 59 (1933), has summarized these effects as follows: "Each of the following
opinions has some express judicial sanction. (i) A presumption puts upon the opponent the
burden of producing evidence which would justify a reasonable jury in finding against the pre-
sumed fact; only this and nothing more. (2) It places upon the opponent the burden of per-
suading the jury to believe so much of the evidence against the presumed fact as would justify
a reasonable jury in finding against the fact. The effect upon the mind of the particular jury
as to the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact is immaterial. (3) It places upon the
opponent the burden of persuading the jury not to disbelieve so much of the evidence against
the presumption as to leave the remainder insufficient to justify a reasonable jury in finding
against the presumed fact. In other words, the presumption will lose all efficacy even though
the jury positively believes none of such evidence, positively discredits a portion of it, and is
unable to determine whether to believe or disbelieve the remainder of it, provided only that
such remainder is of the requisite quantity and quality to justify a reasonable jury in finding
the non-existence of the presumed fact. Again, the effect of the evidence upon the opinion of
the particular jury as to the existence of the presumed fact is immaterial. (4) It puts upon the
opponent the burden of persuading the jury that the existence of the presumed fact is so doubt-
ful that the jury cannot determine whether it exists. Beginning with the assumption that the
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the effect that should be given to the presumption in the res ipsa case, we
discuss briefly five effects that may be given to presumptions in general
and in the following hierarchy, beginning with the least effect: First, the
presumption is rebuttable by defendant by some evidence though it is
without weight or credibility in negativing defendant's negligence; sec-
ond, by evidence which, taken with the plaintiff's case, would justify a
jury in finding that the defendant was as likely not negligent as negligent;
third, by evidence from which a jury, beginning with the assumption that
the defendant was negligent in causing the plaintiff's injury, might reason-
ably find that the defendant was as likely not negligent as negligent;
fourth, by evidence establishing certain facts, such as "what actually oc-
curred" or "how it happened"; and fifth, by evidence sufficient to con-
vince the jury that the defendant was more likely not negligent than
negligent.
It would seem improper to permit the defendant to escape the effect of
the presumption by merely introducing some evidence. To require no
more establishes a distinction between permissible inference and presump-
tion which is without practical significance and all the objections that may
be urged against treating the res ipsa loquitur case as merely raising a basis
for a permissible inference can be urged against it, plus the objection of
allowing a farcical procedure to produce important consequences. To per-
mit a defendant to escape liability by introducing evidence without con-
vincing power also encourages perjury.s9
It would seem too clear for argument that the evidence required of the
defendant to overcome the presumption in favor of the plaintiff should at
least have some persuasive power in rebuttal of the fact of negligence
which the law presumes. How great a persuasive force must it have? The
least probative force required of the plaintiff to make out a res ipsa loqui-
tur case is one from which the judge may infer that a jury might reasonably
presumed fact does exist, the jury must by the evidence be put in such a state of mind that
they cannot say whether it exists or not. (5) It puts upon the opponent the burden of persuad-
ing the jury that the presumed fact does not exist. (6) In addition to one of the foregoing, the
jury must also consider the presumption as evidence or with the evidence in its process of de-
termining whether or not the presumed fact exists. (7) Each of these six views assumes that a
presumption compels the trier upon the establishment of a given fact to assume the existence
of another fact. The term is sometimes used to express the idea that the trier will be permitted
to deduce from the existence of a particular fact the existence of another, even though ordinary
human experience as revealed in judicial experience might not justify such a deduction. (8) Fi-
nally the term is employed with the adjective 'conclusive' to denote a positive rule of law,
either substantive or procedural, which no evidence to the contrary can overthrow. Insofar as
a presumption affects the ctivities of the jury in their consideration or decision of issues, it is
essential that they be advised of its influence in intelligible language."
s5 Mclver v. Schwartz, 5o R.I. 68, 145 AtI. ioi (X929); Pariso v. Towse, 45 F. (2d) 962
(1930); Morgan, Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 80 (1933).
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infer negligence on the part of the defendant as the cause of the plaintiff's
injury. Now to require no more of the defendant than the introduction of
evidence of such persuasive force that it would convince the judge that the
jury might reasonably find from the whole case (the plaintiff's and de-
fendant's) that defendant was as likely not negligent as negligent would be
requiring no more than the introduction of some evidence, no matter how
infinitesimally persuasive it might be. The requirement would be sub-
stantially the same as requiring the introduction of evidence without per-
suasive force.
Going upward in the hierarchy of persuasiveness of proof, the next
practicable step would be to throw the burden on the defendant of con-
vincing the judge that a jury might, assuming the presumed fact of de-
fendant's negligence, in the absence of any rebutting testimony, to be
true, reasonably find from the defendant's testimony that the defendant
was more probably not negligent than negligent, or as likely not negligent
as negligent. This would not conflict with the dogma that the burden of
proof does not shift. But this dogma has been shown to be without merit
and to be disregarded in determining the effect to be given to presumptions.
The persistence of a presumption should depend upon the considerations
which gave rise to it.6 ' While this somewhat complicated test might be
useful to the judge in deciding whether to direct a verdict for the plaintiff
or not, it is very questionable whether it could be made effective as a guide
in an instruction to the jury. If we are inclined to place a high estimation
upon the discriminatory powers of the ordinary jury and admit the test
is a practicable one, it may still be objected that it can not be as clear to a
jury as throwing the burden of proof of absence of negligence on the de-
fendant, and there is no practically workable test between these two. It
has been urged that the purpose of the presumption is satisfied when the
defendant introduces evidence of "what actually took place" or how it hap-
pened.6' The argument is that the presumption was created to relieve the
plaintiff of the disadvantage he was under as respects accessibility to the
evidence and when such evidence is introduced the position of the parties
is equalized and to carry the presumption farther places the plaintiff at an
unfair advantage over the defendant. There are several objections to this
method of handling the presumption. First, the defendant in a large num-
ber of cases does not know "what took place" or "how it happened" and
6o Morgan, Presumptions, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 9o6 (1931); Morgan, Presumptions and Burden
of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59 (1933); Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law
Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 307 (1920); Chaffee, The Progress of the
Law, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 302, 313 (1922), 33 Harv. L. Rev. 306 (igig).
6' Bohlen, Rebuttable Presumptions of Law, 68 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 307, 315 (1920);
Studies in the Law of Torts (1926), 636, 645; Harper, Law of Torts (1933), 185-6, § 77.
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can introduce no evidence as to such fact. The defendant's rebuttal evi-
dence in most res ipsa cases consists in showing due care on his part and
on the part of his servants as respects the construction, inspection and
user of the appliance which caused the injury. It is only by inference from
evidence of this sort that the defendant can be said to show how it hap-
pened. It seems clear that when such evidence is introduced by the de-
fendant it must be weighed as to its probative force in establishing ab-
sence of negligence on the part of the defendant. We cannot lay down a
rule that when the defendant has introduced evidence as respects his care
in the construction, inspection, and user of the appliance, he has proved
anything, much less that he has met the plaintiff's case. This method of
handling the presumption is also wrong in assuming that the basis of
raising a presumption in the res ipsa loquitur doctrine rests upon the plain-
tiff's inaccessibility to the evidence. It also rests upon the further basis
that the plaintiff has established a case of injury which usually results
only from the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff has made out a case
both in law and in fact against the defendant unless the defendant rebuts
it. The impracticability of rebutting the presumption in this way can
easily be imagined if one will simply take a few concrete cases and con-
sider the complicated character of the jury instructions that would be
needed to give it effect.
Finally, what are the arguments for and against giving the effect to the
presumption of casting upon the defendant the full burden of persuasion
of the jury that he was more likely not negligent than negligent? Against
giving such effect to the presumption, it is urged that it violates the rule
that the burden of proof never shifts but only the burden of producing
evidence and, second, that it is unfair to the defendant. In favor of giving
this effect to the presumption, it may be urged that it is the most prac-
ticable and workable and that it more nearly accomplishes the purpose for
which the presumption exists.
The dogma that the burden of proof never shifts has been shown to be
inapplicable where presumptions are involved.2 It is somewhat inaccu-
rate to use the distinction "burden of going forward with the evidence" and
"burden of proof." Wherever the defendant is required to introduce evi-
dence, it always casts upon him a burden of proof to some extent of some-
thing, and it is to prove something that he is required to introduce evi-
dence. It is after all merely a gradation of burdens of proof with which we
deal. The burden of proof cast on the defendant by a presumption might
be merely to convince the judge that a jury might find from his evidence
6 See supra note 6o.
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that the existence of the presumed fact was made doubtful, or it might be
the so-called full burden of persuading the jury that the presumed fact did
not exist or proof of something intermediate between the two. The ex-
pression "burden of producing evidence," without more is unintelligible.
It must be a burden of proof to some extent of something and for some
purpose. The burden of proof of negligence which ordinarily rests upon
the plaintiff is not a burden of proof of negligence to the fullest extent,
namely, beyond a reasonable doubt, but only to the extent that the jury
may be satisfied that it is more likely than not that the defendant was
negligent. There is nothing inherent in the concept of burden of proof
that prevents it from being shifted from the party upon whom the law
originally placed it. It should be shifted if the convenience of trial or rea-
son or justice dictates.
Is it unfair to the defendant, where the plaintiff has established a res
ipsa loquitur case, to require him to assume the burden of introducing
evidence sufficient to satisfy the jury that it is more likely than not that
the defendant was free from negligence? There are two considerations be-
hind the requirement that the defendant assume some burden of proof.
One is that the facts relating to his having a negligent relation to the in-
jury are ordinarily more accessible to the defendant since he has the ex-
clusive possession and control of the appliance whose operation caused the
plaintiff injury, and the other is that the appliance would not ordinarily
produce injury unless there was negligence on the part of the defendant as
to the construction, inspection or user of the appliance. Under such cir-
cumstances, is it unfair to require the defendant to show that it was more
likely than not that the unusual happened in the particular case?
To cast the so-called full burden of persuasion on the defendant is clear-
ly the simplest and most easily understood method of handling a compli-
cated case before the jury. Where the plaintiff has established a res ipsa
loquitur case and the defendant has put in his rebuttal the jury can be in-
structed to find for the plaintiff unless they are satisfied that it is more
likely that defendant was not negligent than that he was. Any less burden
thrown on the defendant complicates the handling of the case with the
jury. To cast the full burden of proof on the defendant seems to best ac-
complish the purpose for which the presumption exists. The defendant
has access to the facts which show his absence of negligence if he is inno-
cent and his guilt if he is not, while the plaintiff who has shown that the
injury could not ordinarily have happened unless the defendant was negli-
gent has ordinarily no chance to rebut the defendant's case. To throw the
full burden of persuasion onto the defendant would seem more likely to se-
cure justice in the larger portion of the cases.
